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Language ideology and language order: conflicts and compromises in colonial and postcolonial Asia

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Abstract: Following Fishman’s (1998/1999. The new linguistic order. Foreign Policy 113. 26–40) seminal work “The new linguistic order”, this article first defines language ideology and order, then studies how they interact dialectically and how the conflicts and compromises between local language ideologies and global language order may have shaped colonization and postcolonial nation-state building in Asia. With colonial and postcolonial cases from Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Central Asia, this study sheds light on how the dialectical relationship between language ideology and language order is crucial to language policy and language management, but does not seem to receive full attention in theory and practice. Attention to this dialectic relationship also extends Fishman’s legacy of work on linguistic order by acknowledging unfolding globalization phenomena since the publication of his article seventeen years ago.

Keywords: language ideology, language order, globalization, colonization, decolonization

1 Introduction

Of Dr. Joshua Fishman’s numerous theoretical contributions to the field of the sociology of language, I am particularly interested in his conceptual framework of language order. In his seminal article “The new linguistic order”, Fishman (1998/1999) outlined a global language order consisting of a super language, some regional languages, and numerous local languages. He mentioned that linguistic order is not synonymous with ideology, but did not examine further the relationship between the two in this work, though he used many examples of ideology and discussed language ideology in detail elsewhere. In this article I elaborate this relationship and study how it is relevant to language policy and language management in colonial and postcolonial Asia.

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I first review the relationship between language ideology and language order in the literature, streamline the two terms, and refine my early definition of the two (Zhou 2009, 2011a). I define language ideology as a superstructure and language order as a reality of institutionalized hierarchical relationships among languages. Language order may be local, regional, and global, but language ideology is generally local. These different essences of language ideology and order interact dynamically and dialectically, and sometimes lead to conflicts and sometimes result in compromises.

With these concepts defined, I review language policy and language management in Asia in relation to colonialism and globalization. First, following Coatsworth’s (2004) categorization of the four cycles of globalization, I briefly look into how language ideology and order were practiced and maintained in relation to colonialism in Asia during early globalization. Second, I examine how former Asian colonies reacted to past colonial language ideologies and orders in decolonization during the first stage of the Fourth Cycle of globalization (1945–1991). Third, I also study how local language ideologies interact with the global language order in decolonization in Asia during the second stage of the Fourth Cycle of globalization (1991–present).

This article expands Fishman’s seminal work to study how language ideology and language order interact dialectically and how the conflicts and compromises between local language ideology and global language order may have shaped both linguistic colonization and linguistic decolonization in Asia. It attempts to shed light on the relationship between local language ideology and global/regional language order, which deserves full attention in theory and practice, for the benefit of a deeper understanding of language policy and language management.

2 Review of language order in relation to language ideology and globalization

The concept of language order was usually referred to as “linguistic order” in the literature. This term was introduced in the middle to the late 1990s (Gifreu 1996; Hassanpour 1999) immediately before the publication of Fishman’s (1998/1999) article. Gifreu (1996) juxtaposed linguistic order and political order in studying language use in media with regard to the Maastricht Treaty that is responsible for the creation of the European Union, but did not define the term “linguistic order”, probably assuming that it is similar to that of political order. Hassanpour (1999) first introduced the term “linguistic order” in his presentation of a paper
in 1997, which was published 2 years later in 1999. Using the case of Med-TV’s Kurdish channel being broadcasted via satellites from Europe, Hassanpour demonstrated in a postmodernist approach how the state of Turkey lost some control of its genocide language policy against the Kurdish language during globalization and technical revolution. Linguistic order viewed in this approach appears to be the interaction of sovereign power and extra-sovereign power in local language management for public access and the use of minority languages. More specific spelling of linguistic order is found in Jacques Maurais (2003) who used the term “linguistic world order” and treated the order in terms of numbers of speakers, internet users, and students. This approach is closer to Fishman’s though the author did not cite Fishman’s (1998/1999) seminal work. More recently, Li and Zhu (2011) introduced the term linguistic “hierarchies” in their analysis of Chinese diaspora communities’ perceptions and beliefs of the market values and symbolic power of varieties of Chinese. Their approach to linguistic hierarchy reveals essential dimensions of the order, but their use of the term is more related to language ideology than language order because they were concerned about the speakers’ views, not the reality of the hierarchy of languages.

When Fishman (1998/1999) used the term “linguistic order”, he did not give it an explicit theoretical definition either. However, he explicitly outlined three levels of languages within the hierarchy, which include super languages, like English, regional languages, like Arabic and Chinese, and numerous local languages. In his categorization of languages within an order, he clearly used at least four criteria in his article. First, the number of speakers, including both first language speakers and second language speakers, was considered. Second, the domains of language use, such as education, banking and international trade, were adopted as a measurement of the ranking. Third, the status of languages, whether a language is designed as a national language or an official language of international organizations, such as the World Bank and European Union, was taken into account. Fourth, a language’s access to resources, such as internet, cultural (re)production, and official empowerment, was included in his ranking of languages. Fishman did not think that language order is language ideology, but he did not explain the relationship between the two concepts, except for mentioning examples of the latter, such as beliefs, views, and values. Fishman’s concept of linguistic order includes almost every aspect, and thus needs some theorization.

What I propose to do is to expand Fishman’s (1998/1999) work by (1) defining language ideology as a superstructure, (2) defining language order as a reality, and (3) conceptualizing the relationship between language ideology and language order in terms of the Marxist dichotomy of ideology and reality.
A theorization of language order and its relationship to language ideology is presented in the following sections.

First, following Woolard’s (1992) dichotomy of a macro level about the politics of languages and a micro level about language structures, I use the term language ideology for the former while reserving the term linguistic ideology for the latter. Language ideology is represented in the works by DeFrancis (1950) and Fishman (1973), who studied the relationship between language and nationalism, as well as the works by Wiley (2000) and Gonzalez and Melis (2000/2001), who examined the relationship among monolingualism, bilingualism, and multilingualism. On the other hand, linguistic ideology is exemplified in the work by Silverstein (1979), who investigated the relationship between linguistic structures and culture/ideology. My focus here is on language ideology.

Language ideology as the politics of language is closely associated with nationalism (see Smith 2010: 5–8). Nationalism may be considered both an ideology, including beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavior, such as social movements that support or symbolize such an ideology (see Fishman 1973: 4–10; Hutchinson and Smith 1994). This kind of behavior may include the speaking of a certain language or vernacular. In this regard, nationalism in its early development in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries mainly fought against localism in the development from ethnicity to nationality when one vernacular emerged over others as the national language (see Fishman 1973: 58–62). Elsewhere in the twentieth century, nationalism following the Western European model of the holy trinity – holy people, holy land, and holy language or its more modern form of one state, one people and one language – confronted both colonialism and localism when developing countries had to entertain multilingualism within and from outside (Fishman 1973: 44, Fishman 1968; DeFrancis 1950: 55–84). Today nationalism’s great rivalry is the Fourth Cycle of globalization that presses the use of global languages, particularly the super language – English – for wider communication across national boundaries via the internet and transnational institutions, leading to what is considered supra-nationality of communities of nation-states, such as the European Union (see Truchot 2003).

2.1 Language order and language ideology as dialectic

With the above review in order, I provide an explicit definition of the concept of language ideology, following my earlier approach (Zhou 2009, 2011a) based on Fishman (1998/1999). Language ideology consists of a system of beliefs, assumptions, presuppositions, ideas, values, and attitudes about whether multilingualism or monolingualism should be practiced, which language is valued...
and which is not, which language is “our” language, and which belongs to others, etc. Value orientations develop from such an ideology. If people believe that monolingualism should be practiced, they will consider multilingualism as a problem. If people value multilingualism, they will treat languages as resources. In this sense, multilingualism and monolingualism are ideologies that represent contrasting value orientations of language ideology. Thus, language ideology includes three value orientations: language-as-problem, language-as-right, and language-as-resource (Ruiz 1984; Hornberger 1988). These orientations are good reflections of language ideology itself. From the point of view of nationalism, languages are generally considered as problems because bilingualism or multilingualism is a challenge for nationalism that seeks to promote and maintain monolingualism at the expenses of local languages and dialects (see Galindo 1997; Kasuya 2001; Macias 1985). Nationalism uses monolingualism as a means to unity, legitimacy, authenticity, and identity (Fishman 1973: 6–10, 44–55). Language as resource is acceptable to nationalism only when multilingualism is needed as a resource for nationalism. In this context, language as resource is repacked either as “national competitiveness” for economic globalization or “linguistic competence” for national security (see Kelly-Holmes and Mautner 2010; Ricento 2005). Such repackaging is the result of the utility of one of the value orientations of language ideology.

Second, on the other hand, language order is reality. Following Fishman’s (1998/1999) concept, my approach here is an explicit specification of the role of institutions and their functions in creating and maintaining language order. I define language order as an institutionalized hierarchical relationship among languages in a local community, a nation-state, a regional community, or the global community (Zhou 2009, 2011a). This hierarchical relationship is defined by languages’ access to resources, including official status, domains of use, legal protection, financial support, channels of spread, number of native speakers, number of second language speakers, technical support, etc. The more access to these resources a language has, the higher its position is in the hierarchy. Access to these resources is regulated first by institutions, such as local governments or nation-states, that govern local or national language orders. Access to these resources is also regulated by regional and global institutions that support and maintain regional and global language orders. The regulation of the access to resources is done through language policy and management.

Third, a dialectical relationship exists between language ideology as a superstructure and language order as a reality from a Marxist perspective (see Marx and Engels 1846/1947: 1–78). Language ideology is a representation of people’s views and beliefs of what language order is or should be, but it is not merely a passive representation. As the superstructure, language ideology
shapes how people put economic, aesthetic, and identity values on a language or dialect and how people select a language or dialect to use accordingly (Blum 2004; Li and Zhu 2011). In some cases, language ideology may be realized as language policies, though not always (Spolsky 2004: 14). In other cases, language ideology may be materialized as social and political movements that change the existing language order. For example, the ideology of English Only unfolds as a social and political movement that supports pro-monolingualism candidates for public offices and pushes for legislation that limits multilingualism and bans bilingual education in the United States (see Fishman 1988; Wiley 2000). On the other hand, a language order once established may find its representation prevailing in language ideology. For example, when Putonghua, a variety of Mandarin, was selected as the official language of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the mid-1950s, it had no native speakers as it is officially defined. Today Putonghua’s predominance is found both in language ideology and order within China (Zhou 2002, 2012) and outside China (Li and Zhu 2011; Liu and Wiley 2014). These examples demonstrate that: (1) a language ideology precedes the establishment of a language order; (2) a language order cultivates a supporting language ideology once it is established; and (3) the two affect each other. This dialectic relationship expresses itself as tension between language ideology and order in colonization and decolonization during globalization.

2.2 Language order and language ideology in relation to globalization

With the conceptual framework of language ideology, order and their relationship explicitly reviewed, I now examine conflicts and compromises between language ideology and order in colonization and decolonization in relation to globalization. Coatsworth (2004) suggests that globalization has been unfolding in four cycles: (1) the colonization of the Americas and the cross-Atlantic trade from 1492 to the early 1600s; (2) the cross-ocean slavery trade and the establishment of slavery plantations in the New World from 1650 to 1790; (3) a huge increase in international trade, capital, technology, and population flows from the late 1800s to the 1930s; and (4) the unfolding cycle after World War II. I think that Coatsworth’s Fourth Cycle should be divided into two stages, if not two independent cycles: the first is from the end of World War II (1945) to the end of the Cold War (1991) while the second spans from the end of the Cold War to the present. I call the former Fourth Cycle 1 and the latter Fourth Cycle 2 of globalization. These two stages have fundamental differences in ideology,
modes of communication, modes of collaboration, and modes of economic activities. Fourth Cycle 1 saw more ideological, political and economic confrontations than collaborations during the Cold War, though the United Nations (UN) was created then. Fourth Cycle 2 began with the end of the Cold War, has endured through the rise of the internet and an intensified global economy, and has thus seen more collaborations through international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the UN. Such collaborations have been facilitated by new technologies such as the Internet, leading to free movement of people, capital, goods, jobs, services, information, ideas, and values that have created so-called knowledge economies, new democracies, and a new world order (Coatsworth 2004). The relationship between language ideology and order are different in these two cycles. I investigate their relationship in Fourth Cycle 1, and then in Fourth Cycle 2 after first reviewing Asia’s experiences of colonial language ideology and order in the Third Cycle.

3 Language ideology and language order in colonial Asia

Colonialism is the consequence of economic globalization so that it is expected to represent ideologies and orders that facilitated this kind of globalization. However, colonial language ideology and order are found not to be associated with economically-oriented colonialism, but closely tied to territorially-oriented colonialism where language ideology promoted language order.

Whether it is considered as “an extraeconomic hegemonial relation designed exclusively for exploitation” or “a variant of international economics” (Gottheil 1977: 83), European colonialism started with a simple economic motivation in Asia, from Portugal’s and Spain’s pursuits for spice trade in the 15th and 16th centuries to Dutch East India Company and British East India Company in the 17th and 18th centuries, though political and territorial claims were to follow later on. These colonizers were a combination of traders, mercenaries, and pirates in one, who were unlike the settlers in North America at least in one way. The later group amalgamated their commercial venture with a civilizing mission to ensure the success of their settlements and to convert the indigenous Indians into Christianity, a practice that is now considered as a routine colonial process (Lawrence 1980: 56–57). However, with sole commercial interests, European colonizers did not carry out any civilizing projects in Asian colonies until the late eighteenth century (Mann 2004: 4). This kind of civilizing project
was then known as “improvement”, “betterment”, or “moral and material progress” in Britain, or “mission civilisatrice” in France. Founded on the European assumption of their moral, material, and racial superiority, this mission included Christian values and rule of law, on the one hand, and technology, public health, and economic development, on the other. The European civilizing projects are different from traditional Asian civilizing projects, such as imperial China’s which centered on two pillars: the Chinese language and Confucianism, indicating the Han Chinese moral and cultural superiority (Zhou 2011b: 50–51). In addition to racism, European civilizing projects in Asia did not begin with European languages and Christianity as the foundations as exemplified in the case of colonial India.

In colonial India, a British civilizing mission based on English and Christianity was given limited consideration only in the nineteenth century. For instance, Christian education was intended for the elite in the nineteenth century while the mass majority was to be included only in the long run, not just for the lack of infrastructures but mainly for the dangerous egalitarian Christian ideas that might instigate discontent and rebellion against colonial rule (Mann 2004: 11–19). For this reason, English education was at first problematic for British colonizers because the English language was directly connected to the British identity, not appropriated for all Indians then. Thus, the British colonizers proposed to educate only an elite class of Indians in English to assist the British rule of India, a class that was expected to develop English in taste, opinion, moral, and intellect (Mann 2004: 20). The British colonial language ideology and order are more related to its territorial claim than its economic interest in India. Thus, the debate on how to educate Indians and in what language occurred only in the first half of the nineteenth century when Britain was claiming sovereignty over India. English schools for the elite were established first by the East India Company and later by the British government when Queen Victoria became Empress of India in 1857 (Amritavalli and Jayaseelan 2007: 74–75). This British language ideology led to the establishment of a language order that is characterized by “divide-and-rule”. This order reflected both the stratification of social classes and the division of ethnicity and religion (see Sonntag 1995: 101–105). Within the social stratification, the British colonial administration identified and strengthened the caste system (Mann 2004: 23). The elite received an education from primary schools to colleges in English, while the masses belonging to the lower caste received education in their indigenous languages if they received any education at all. The elite served the British colonial administration either within the Imperial Civil Service or outside it in their professions. They communicated between the British colonial administration and the Indian mass in assisting the British rule. At the same
time, within the ethnic and religious division, different groups were not encouraged to use the same language, be it English, Hindi, or Urdu. Thus, for example, Hindi was used among the Hindus whereas Urdu was used among the Muslims. The structure of the British colonial language order gave no place to a national language for India and resulted in disunity among the Indians as a nation. The British divide-and-rule language ideology was also applied in its other Southeast Asian colonies.

The British represented its fellow European powers, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Spaniard, in colonialism without a civilizing mission, at least for the first few centuries, in Asia. There was no language order, without language ideology, then. If a civilizing mission is missing in the economically-oriented colonialism, then it is predominant in the territorially-oriented colonialism as in the cases of Russian/Soviet colonialism in Central Asia and Japanese colonialism in East Asia, both described below.

Russian/Soviet colonialism in Central Asia may be generally divided into the Russian period and the Soviet period (Caroe 1953; Wheeler 1975). As early as the second half of the eighteenth century during Catherine II’s regime, Russification of the conquered peoples was seen as an essential component of Russia’s territorial expansion (Laitin et al. 1992; Pavlenko 2006). Russian language policy based on this ideology was carried out sometimes more leniently and sometimes more intensively, targeting more closely at its European colonies than its Central Asian colonies, throughout the nineteenth century. This policy supported a language order, which was followed by the Russian administrations and schools in its colonies. For example, local languages, along with local cultures and literatures, were either marginalized or even banned in schools (Laitin et al. 1992: 135–136). However, this policy was implemented in Russia’s Central Asian colonies less consistently, probably because the Central Asians were not considered Slavic, resisted learning Russian, and did not have sufficient learning conditions (Pavlenko 2006: 79–80). For example, in Turkestan, secular schools were opened to train translators and clerks for the Russian administration in early nineteenth century, Russo-native schools were instituted in towns in the second half of the nineteenth century, and a complete network of such schools was set up by the end of the nineteenth century (Johnson 2004; Murpeis 2005). These schools might not have led to massive spread of Russian there since the Russian administration did not intend any mass education for the local people at that time (Ubiria 2016: 55). However, by the end of the nineteenth century, Central Asia was considered “Russian soil” as the monument of K. P. fon Kaufman (1818–1882) in Tashkent reads, “If I die as governor-general, please bury me here, so that all may know that here is true Russian soil, where no Russian needed be shamed to lie” (Sahadeo 2007: 1).
The Soviet Union inherited the Tsarist legacy, though in the late 1910s and 1920s it appeared to attempt to cut its tie with that legacy. In the early years, the Soviet Union promoted the use of native languages in Central Asia, but Russian continued to dominate government, education, and the media. With the transfer from the Arabic script to the Latin script, further to the Cyrillic script for the Central Asian languages in the 1930s, Russification was gradually intensified and glorified (Pavlenko 2006). From then on, the ideology of Russification was to guide two processes in structuring the order of multilingualism in the Soviet, as G. P. Serdyuchenko shared with his Chinese colleagues in Beijing in the mid-1950s (Zhou 2010). The first process was to russify the indigenous people so that they were taught Russian and Soviet values, and were expected to speak Russian and behave in accordance with the Soviet values. The second process was to russify the indigenous languages by loaning the Cyrillic script, new terminology, and grammatical features from Russian into these languages. Russian was expected to function as the main track, while the indigenous languages were expected to operate as the satellite track. The two tracks would merge when the Soviet peoples were to fuse into one people under communism. This language order was represented in a dual school system, which had Russian schools and non-Russian schools (Pavlenko 2006: 82–83). However, this school system was weakened by the 1970s when there were more Russian schools than indigenous language schools in Central Asian republics, such as Kazakhstan. Then, the Soviet Union appeared to have consolidated Russian language ideology and order that were initiated by the Tsars since the eighteenth century.

Like the Russians, the Japanese started its colonialism in Taiwan and Korea with a civilizing mission to Japanize local peoples. The concept of Japanization includes a language ideology (Kokugo) and a cult (Shinto) (Pak and Hwang 2011; Tai 1999). The concept of Kokugo envisioned a language order with Japanese as the dominant national language ruling over a number of subordinated ethnic national languages as well as with Japanese as the designated official language for the government (kokka-go) (Lee 1996: 182–192). At the same time, Shinto was used to cultivate a Japanese spirit in the colonized subjects for Emperor worship and loyalty to Japan. To implement Japanization in colonial Taiwan and Korea, Japanese colonial administrations set up a school system with two tracks, a Japanese one and a common one, since the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The Japanese schools enrolled Japanese residents there and children of the elite local collaborators, whereas the common schools were open to children of the Taiwanese and Koreans. The common schools ran a strong Japanese language program with the same number of hours as that of the local languages per week, the latter of which was also used to introduce Japanese culture. To intensify Japanization after the second Sino-Japanese war started in
1937, the colonial administrations expanded Japanese language education in common schools to replace local languages such as Taiwanese and Korean, completing the evolution from an ordered multilingualism with Japanese at the top to Japanese monolingualism in Japan’s East Asian colonies.

As the Pacific War was unfolding in the early 1940s, Japanese language ideology evolved to support a language order beyond Taiwan and Korea, reaching out to its Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere for East Asia and even the entirety of Asia. Then emerged the concept of Nihongo that designated Japanese as an international language taught to non-native speakers, since the concept of Kokugo was not sufficient to deal with the rapid expansion of the Japanese colonial empire (Lee 1996; Tai 1999: 195–196). Those teaching Japanese in its new colonies were given the mission to create a new world order, which required a new type of ordered multilingualism. For instance, when Japan took over Indonesia from the Dutch in 1942, it was impossible to replace Dutch with Japanese in colonial administration and education overnight, though Japanese was immediately introduced in schools. As a result, the Japanese colonial administration adopted a plan for two steps (Kaplan and Baldauf 2003: 88–89; Simpson 2007a: 326–328). The first step was to replace Dutch with Indonesian (Malay) so that the administration and education could keep running. The second step, or the long-term goal, was to teach Japanese as an international language so that Japanese would play the role that Dutch played in Indonesia. Thus, Nihongo envisioned an international language order with Japanese as an international language at the top of the hierarchy in contrast to Kokugo’s vision of a national language order with Japanese at the top as the national language.

Asian colonial experiences demonstrate that (1) language ideology preceded language order and (2) the combination of the two sought dominance beyond economy during the Third Cycle of globalization. When the relationship among language, nation, nationalism, and state became closer, colonial powers were exploring how to project and maintain their rule with the help of their language ideology and order.

4 Conflicts of language ideologies and orders in colonial and postcolonial Asia

When the Fourth Cycle 1 of globalization started at the end of World War II in 1945, colonized Asian countries and regions were either still struggling for or already received emancipation from three or four centuries of colonialism. The Japanese colonization of Korea and Taiwan was immediately terminated as
Japan was defeated at the end of the war in August 1945. In the following decade or so, in the face of rising nationalism, either in armed struggle or civil movements for independence or the combination of both, and thanks to the competition with the Communist World for the moral high ground, the West reluctantly gave up or was forced to give up its colonies, such as India, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In preparation for decolonization and during the transition from colonialism to independence, language became one of the first issues of the birth of independent nations where the colonial language ideologies and orders collided with nationalist language ideologies and orders. Typologically, this collision resulted in two types of configurations of language ideologies and orders: (1) direct transition to a nationalist language order with the support of a strong nationalist language ideology and (2) phased transition to a nationalist language order with a still consolidating nationalist language ideology. The consequences of these two categories demonstrate a dialectical relationship between language ideology and order.

As their important role in the colonial rule, language ideology and order played an equally crucial role or even more important role in new nation-state building and decolonization in Asia. The relationship between language and nation-state (building) was introduced from the West first to Japan during the Meiji Restoration in the late nineteenth century and further spread to China and other Asian nations (DeFrancis 1950: 1–83; Tai 1999). From then on, language ideology becomes a key component of nationalism and language order becomes an essential part of nation-state building in Asia.

First, there were colonies where the national identity and national language had been already well defined with a unifying nationalist language ideology and order before or during the colonial rule. During colonialism, nationalist language ideologies and orders constantly resisted the colonial language ideology and order. For instance, with a well-established Korean nationalist language ideology and order, Korean activists founded the Korean Language Society in 1921, which persistently promoted Korean standardization, orthographic reforms, and other codification against Japanese as the colonial national language until its members were jailed or exiled in the early 1940s (King 2007: 206–208). Apparently, Korean nationalist language ideology became an important aspect of Korean nationalism against Japanese colonial rule. Indonesia presents a different example where a nationalist language ideology and order were formed during the colonial rule when Malay rose to become a lingua franca along with Dutch at first and Japanese later (Simpson 2007b: 312–336). As such, Malay was utilized as a balance against the colonial languages in Indonesia’s struggle for independence and thus became Bahasa Indonesia in characterizing the Indonesian national identity, leading to an Indonesian nationalist language ideology and
order in the transition from colonialism to independence in the late 1940s and early 1950s when Indonesian became the national language of the new nation-state. Korea and Indonesia represent the first group that also include former colonies and occupied countries, such as Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Manchuria, where nationalist language ideologies and orders immediately replaced the colonial ones as the war ended in 1945 or as they won their independence after the war. The transition from the colonial language orders to the nationalist language orders generally went smoothly with the support of well-formed nationalist language ideologies.

The second group of colonies includes those that did not have a nationalist language ideology and order before colonial rule nor develop a unified one during colonialism. This group had to compromise, not with the colonial language ideology, but with various competing ideologies within their independence movements. As a result, they had to rely partly on the colonial language order, at least temporarily, during decolonization, as seen in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar, Cambodia, and the Philippines.

India is a good example in this regard where nationalist language ideologies and orders underwent infighting because of the vast linguistic diversity there and the British divide-and-rule approach (see Amritavalli and Jayaseelan 2007; Dua 1993). The first conflict within is that between Hindus and Muslims who fought for the dominance of Hindi and Urdu respectively after Gandhi’s failed efforts to promote Hindustani as the lingua franca for India. This conflict finally ended in the partition of British colonial India into the contemporary rivalries of India and Pakistan. The second conflict within is that between Hindi-speakers and non-Hindi speakers, such as the Tamil speakers, the former group sought the dominance of Hindi whereas the latter group strove for a place for their native languages in government and education. The second conflict led to a compromise among the various groups for a tripartite language order with Hindi as the official language at the federal level, English as the official language for the transition also at the federal level, and other languages, such as Tamil, as the official language of the provinces. The tripartite language order was consolidated, not dismantled, in the following decades as a compromise among various ethnic groups in India, though India’s constitution envisioned Hindi as the national language in place of English early on. The existing language order has generated a strong supporting ideology since then.

During the Fourth Cycle 1 of globalization, the Cold War was ushered in as the greatest ideological confrontation in human history. The confrontation between colonialism and nationalism was uncompromising. Our discussion above shows a dynamic and dialectical relationship between language ideology and order. Revealing ideology’s shaping effect on reality, former colonies with a
strong nationalist language ideology successfully replaced both the colonial language ideology and order, whereas those without a well-formed nationalist language ideology had to rely partially on the colonial language order. On the other hand, transitional language order has staying power because as reality it generates a supporting ideology.

5 Compromises in language ideology and order in postcolonial Asia

Compromises between the colonizers and the colonized did not occur until the Fourth Cycle 2 of globalization, which is characterized by the so-called knowledge economies, new democracies, and a new world order since the 1990s (Coatsworth 2004). Thus, collaboration is more important and productive than confrontation, even in decolonization. Two different cases of decolonization occurred in Asia during this cycle. The first case is Hong Kong and Macau whose decolonization was negotiated between the PRC, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and Portugal on the other. The second case is the five Central Asian states whose decolonization was peacefully resolved after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. These two kinds of decolonization underwent negotiated and/or rationalized realignments of language ideologies and orders, showing that nationalist language ideologies accommodate regional and global language orders. I first explore the Chinese case and then focus on the Central Asian case.

After four-year’s negotiation, China and the United Kingdom reached a Sino-British Joint Declaration at the end of 1984. The declaration is an exemplary model of compromises, according to which the United Kingdom was to hand over Hong Kong to China without any conditions and China was to follow the principle of one country (the PRC) and two systems (socialist mainland and capitalist Hong Kong). It did not mention the language order after the handover, but it promised free movement of people, goods, capital, etc. under the watch of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) (Article 3, see Hong Kong [1984]). In the following 5 years, a law, known as the Basic Law of HKSAR, was drafted by a drafting committee consisting of members from both the Mainland and Hong Kong in consultation with a consultative committee whose members were exclusively residents of Hong Kong. The law was promulgated by the Chinese National People’s Congress, the supreme legislative body of the PRC, in April 1990 (see Hong Kong 1990). Article 9 of the law stipulates that English may be used, along with Chinese,
as an official language, in the government, legislature, and court of law, and Article 136 specifies that the government of HKSAR may decide on the language of instruction in schools. To disambiguate the term “Chinese”, the government of HKSAR developed a language policy of biliteracy (written English and Modern Standard Chinese) and trilingualism (English, Cantonese, and Putonghua) in 1999 (see Zhang and Yang 2004), which represent the new language ideology and order in decolonized Hong Kong.

Right before the transfer in 1997, out of 6,217,556 residents in Hong Kong, 95.88 percent spoke a variety of Chinese, whereas only 4.12 percent spoke English and other languages (Hong Kong 1997: 48). It is obvious that the adoption of English in the law was not a linguistic necessity, but political and economic. Politically the PRC’s adoption of English as an official language in the law assured both the British and the residents of Hong Kong that it intended to fully follow the one-country and two-system principle. Economically the adoption reassured the international community of Hong Kong’s continued status as a free port for free trade and a capitalist finance center of Asia and the world. The interpretation of Chinese as one literacy and bilingualism (in contrast to Mainland China where Chinese is treated as one literacy and monolingualism), is a domestic compromise that recognizes Putonghua as the national language of the PRC and Cantonese as the dominant player in Hong Kong, where 83.57 percent of the residents spoke it then. Thus, the language ideology in decolonized Hong Kong acknowledges the language orders of the PRC, Hong Kong, and the international community and accommodates them in structuring the new order.

The case of Macau further illustrates this flexible approach by the PRC. Following the Hong Kong model, China and Portugal started their negotiation in 1986 and signed a Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration in 1987. The declaration reaffirmed the same principle of one country and two systems in Macau’s decolonization and the use of both Chinese and Portuguese as official languages (Macau 1987). Immediately after the signing of the declaration, in preparation for the transition, the Portuguese colonial administration of Macau added Chinese as an official language for the government, legislature, and court of law, though schools there had already been triliterate (Portuguese, Chinese, and English) and quadrilingual (Portuguese, Putonghua, Cantonese, and English) (see Mann and Wong 1999; Shan and Leong 2008). After the transfer of power in 1999, the Macau Special Administrative Region (MCSAR) has maintained the official bilingual policy in government and continued the practice of triliteracy and quadrilingualism in schools. The multilingual ideology and language order in decolonized Macau are also the PRC’s compromises to Portugal, Macau, and the international community for political and economic reasons, since 96.9 percent of the half
million residents there were speakers of Chinese varieties and only 0.7 percent
were speakers of Portuguese right after the transition (Macau 2002: 37–38).

Dialogues and compromises were also seen in the realignment of language
ideologies and orders in decolonization in Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991. The process of de-russification actually started during Mikhail
Gorbachov’s *glasnost* years (1985–1991) when the non-Russian peoples in the
Soviet republics were encouraged to replace seven decades of russification with
linguistic nativization (Kellner-Heinkele and Landau 2012: 9–12). Starting in
1989, the five Central Asian Soviet republics, which are now known as
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, successively
passed new laws that upgraded the titular languages as the state languages and
designated Russian as the language for inter-ethnic communication, with the
exception of Tajikistan which failed to give Russian such a designation.
Subsequent independence in 1991 made it possible for these five Central Asian
states to enshrine these linguistic designations in their new constitutions with
very little change (Smith et al. 1998: 150–151). In their constitutions and laws,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan upgraded Russian as an official language, and
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan retained Russian as the language of interethnic
communication, but Uzbekistan downgraded Russian by not giving it any des-
ignation in its constitution.

There is no doubt that these newly independent states needed their titular
languages in characterizing their rising national identities. Thus, nationalism, as
expressed in language ideologies, evolved to support their efforts in nation-state
building through the governments’ language management, resulting in the
language orders described above (see Spolsky 2009: 144–180). On the other
hand, these ideologies and orders also represent compromises at several levels
since Russian was not simply replaced with the titular languages but given roles
in their post-Soviet societies. Domestically the division between rural popula-
tions and urban populations had to be considered, and so were the Russian
population and other minorities (Akiner 1998). During the Soviet years, urban
populations in the five Central Asian states were mostly russified, being able to
speak little or no titular languages whereas the herdsmen and farmers in rural
communities were mostly speakers of titular languages. In addition, a consider-
able Russian population, ranging from about 8 percent in Uzbekistan to more
than 40 percent in Kazakhstan in the late 1980s, was monolingual and never
motivated to learn the titular languages, though they migrated to or were born in
Central Asia. Russian was then the only lingua franca among the titular peoples,
Russophones, Russians, and minorities. These groups and their linguistic divi-
sions influenced the realignment of language ideologies and orders in Central
Asia in favor of retaining Russian as the language of wider communication.
Internationally, these five Central Asian states had to take into consideration their relationships with each other, the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), and Russian Federation (Belokrenitsky 1998). They still had close economic, political, military, and security ties so that they had to balance these relationships linguistically as they endorsed their state language ideologies and created their language orders. For the same purpose, these countries introduced English in their schools where trilingual education in the titular languages, Russian, and English emerged since the 1990s as these Central Asian states get ready to embrace the global community beyond the Russian world (Kellner-Heinkele and Landau 2012).

The Chinese case of Hong Kong and Macau as well as the Central Asian case demonstrate that nationalist language ideologies, at least the state endorsed ones, are usually more realistic in the Fourth Cycle 2 of globalization. In this cycle, existing or newly emerging states recognize the reality of a global language order and give it room in the construction of their new state or local language orders, indicating language orders’ active impact on language ideology.

6 Conclusion

In this article I have reviewed Fishman’s concepts of linguistic order (1998/1999) and nationalism (1973) and streamlined these two terms as “language order” and “language ideology” in order to differentiate them from narrower concepts of linguistic order and linguistic ideology. I have found that Fishman’s conceptual framework is more powerful when the dynamic and dialectical relationship between language ideology and language order is taken into consideration. It helps us to develop a better understanding of language policy and management in globalization.

With Fishman’s powerful conceptual framework expanded, I have examined the evolution of language ideologies and orders in colonization and decolonization in Asia. This investigation reveals that (1) language ideology and language order became predominant in colonization and nation-state-building only since the nineteenth century when territorial claims were made; (2) language ideology generally precedes the creation of a language order and the latter is a realization of a brand of the former or a compromised or prioritized realization of the former; (3) language ideology and order may be packed for wholesale or unpacked for promotion or retention separately; (4) existing language order may generate supporting language ideology; and (5) language order may be local, national, regional, and global, but language ideology is always localized.
Language order and ideology are just two of many theoretical contributions that Fishman made to the field of the sociology of language in his long and productive career. It is up to a younger generation of scholars to take advantage of the unlimited resources from his contributions in the inquiry of the role of language in political, social, and economic life in our society.

References


